Accomplice Witnesses and Organized Crime: Theory and Evidence from Italy

We develop an agency model of organized crime accounting for the main trade‐offs involved in the introduction of an accomplice‐witness program. We characterize the optimal policy and identify its main determinants in a framework where public officials can be dishonest. Our predictions are tested by using data for Italy before and after the introduction of the 1991 accomplice‐witness program. As predicted by the model and the earlier antitrust literature, the program appears to have strengthened deterrence and enhanced prosecution. Moreover, consistent with a novel prediction of our theory, the evidence suggests that the program efficacy is affected by the judicial system efficiency.     

Does longer incarceration deter or incapacitate crime? Evidence from Truth-in-Sentencing reform

This article evaluates how Truth-in-Sentencing (TIS) laws impact both violent and property crimes through mandating violent offenders to serve a substantial proportion of sentenced terms before being eligible to release to community supervision. Focusing on states with effective TIS laws, I utilize the difference-in-differences design to investigate the treatment effect of TIS on crime. I observe statistically significant decline in both violent and property crimes in TIS states. A series of placebo tests confirm the robustness of the estimates and inferences. The dynamic impact of TIS is heterogeneous among the seven categories of violent and property crimes in TIS states: murder and robbery rates decline almost immediately after TIS, while property crime takes longer time to exhibit significant decline.     

Sanctions that signal: An experiment

The introduction of sanctions provides incentives for more pro-social behavior, but may also be a signal that non-cooperation is prevalent. In an experimental minimum-effort coordination game we investigate the effects of the information contained in the choice to sanction. We compare the effect of sanctions that are introduced exogenously by the experimenter to that of sanctions which have been actively chosen by a subject who has superior information about the previous effort of the other players. We find that cooperative subjects perceive actively chosen sanctions as a negative signal which significantly reduces the effect of sanctions.     

Raising Rivals’ Fixed Costs

This article demonstrates that raising fixed costs can serve as a credible mechanism for a well placed firm to exclude its rivals. We identify a number of credible avenues, such as increased regulation, vexatious litigation and increased prices for essential inputs, through which such a firm can raise fixed costs. We show that for a wide range of oligopoly models this may be a profitable strategy, even if the firm’s own fixed costs are affected as much (or even more) than its rivals and even if it is less efficient. The resulting reduction in the number of firms in the market is detrimental to consumer welfare and hence worthy of scrutiny by competition and regulatory authorities.     

STRATEGIC ENTRY DETERRENCE: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ECONOMICS OF INDUSTRY

Abstract. This paper reviews the recent developments in the economics of industry with respect to strategic entry deterrence. Starting from Bain's (1956) classical analysis, a simple two-stage game between an incumbent firm and a potential entrant is used to present the general structure of the entry deterrence problem. Commitments, credible threat and sub-game perfection are illustrated in this context. The various strategic variables that an incumbent firm can use to bar entry are discussed. The issue of whether a group of incumbents can non-cooperatively deter entry is taken up and some empirical evidence is reviewed.     

从要件识别到变量评估： 刑事司法如何破解“定性难题”

“法律先于法学”的事实意味着负责罪责评价的人类道德直觉是刑法最初的立法依据,而刑法学理论回避解码道德直觉,选择了“填充犯罪分类表”的捷径,虽有刑法教义作补充,但终究没能揭示刑法的底层逻辑。罪责评价的绝对尺度是犯罪的预期损失,因此定罪量刑需要考虑破案率、作案成功率等决定刑罚威慑水平和犯罪预期损失的各种变量。以变量评估取代要件识别,可以有效应对刑事司法实践中的定性难题。     

Market Preemption and Entry Deterrence: Evidence from the Golf Course Industry

The population in a given geographical area has to be large enough before the area can support the entry of a golf course. The required amount of population will be higher if costs are higher, or if the underlying demand to golf by residents is lower, or if there is more preexisting competition from incumbent golf courses. If incumbent golf courses undertake entry‐deterring strategies, either explicitly or implicitly, the required population will be higher still. If population is expected to grow quickly, then the amount of population required by the entry date could be lower. These effects are measured and analyzed in this empirical study of the entry of 104 golf courses in the greater San Francisco Bay Area between 1893 and 2001.     

Strategic Implications of Learning by Doing

This paper examines firm strategy when competitors are at different points along the learning curve. It shows that firms high on the learning curve will have strong incentives to exclude new competitors, while firms that are learning more slowly will have weaker incentives to hinder new competitors and may even wish to encourage entry. The same strategies are shown to apply when firm reputation is acquired through participation in an industry. Several examples of strategic behaviour that take advantage of differential learning speeds or heterogeneous reputations are suggested and a variety of applications of the principle involved are explored.     

Tax Evasion, Risky Laundering, and Optimal Deterrence Policy

This paper extends the Allingham and Sandmo's (1972) model of income tax evasion to take account of laundering opportunities, allowing the taxpayer to determine not only the amount of actual income to declare but also the amount of undeclared income to launder. Laundering, aside of entailing direct costs, is assumed to be an unlawful activity, subject to the risk of detection and punishment. The tax authorities devote separate resource efforts to initial audits which may detect undeclared income that has not been laundered and to in-depth investigation which may detect undeclared income that has been laundered. The paper analyzes the effects of laundering incentives on evasion and derives guidelines for the optimal design of a joint evasion/laundering deterrence policy. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.