基于Stackelberg均衡的第三方物流分包质量合同模型

如何管理、控制分包商的运作质量,使之符合第三方物流服务需求方的质量标准,本文在AlfredssonM构建的第三方物流提供者与分包商之间的Nash均衡模型的基础上,从第三方物流提供者与分包商的决策行为出发,提出了基于stackelberg均衡的第三方物流服务分包质量合同模型,并比较了第三方物流提供者和分包商对Nash均衡博弈结构和stackelberg博弈结构的决策取向。     

The generalized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information

We characterize the equilibrium of the all-pay auction with general convex cost of effort and sequential effort choices. We consider a set of n players who are arbitrarily partitioned into a group of players who choose their efforts ‘early’ and a group of players who choose ‘late’. Only the player with the lowest cost of effort has a positive payoff in any equilibrium. This payoff depends on his own timing vis-a-vis the timing of others. We also show that the choice of timing can be endogenized, in which case the strongest player typically chooses ‘late’, whereas all other players are indifferent with respect to their choice of timing. In the most prominent equilibrium the player with the lowest cost of effort wins the auction at zero aggregate cost. We thank Dan Kovenock and Luis C. Corchón for discussion and helpful comments. The usual caveat applies. Wolfgang Leininger likes to express his gratitude to Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB) for its generous hospitality and financial support.     

单位运输成本变化的供应链模型分析

在需求信息不确定情况下，由一个供应商和一个经销商构成两级供应链系统，考虑谊系统在商品边际运输费用随订货量增加而递减的情况，分析经销商采集需求不确定信息的必要备件，指出供销双方共享需求不确定信息的条件，以厦供应链系统中多个经销商联合订货的优势。     

中国外汇储备投资组合选择——基于外汇储备循环路径的内生性分析

本文从中美两国经济的本质性差异出发,通过刻画中国外汇储备对外投资的"循环路径",构建了包括央行、金融市场和实体经济的斯塔克尔伯格及古诺模型,进而模拟出中国外汇储备对外投资对本国经济的间接贡献、合意的外汇储备投资组合,以及最优外汇储备投资规模。研究结果表明,中国外汇储备投资于美国风险资产的规模将影响外汇储备间接转化为美国对中国FDI的比例。同时,中国央行外汇储备规模及投资策略对危机时期的反应不足。改变外汇储备投资收益的主要方法包括降低居民的相对风险回避系数,通过政策引导促进居民消费,以及大力发展中国金融市场,降低对美国金融市场的依赖程度。     

Cost Uncertainty and Unilateral Abatement

Unilateral abatement is sometimes advocated in order to set a good example that will make other countries follow. The aim of this paper is to investigate whether existence of correlated cost uncertainty provides an incentive for a country to undertake unilateral abatement. The theoretical model is driven by two main mechanisms; first, a learning effect, as the follower country might reduce its risk premium as it can observe the cost level in the leader country. Second, there is the public good effect, i.e., the marginal benefit of abatement declines when abatement is a public good and other countries contribute to pollution reductions. Results shows that unilateral abatement would be efficient in reducing uncertainty about the unit costs of abatement if a country with low cost uncertainty would undertake abatement first, while a country with initially high cost uncertainty would follow. However, countries may prefer to act simultaneously because of the larger uncertainties that are inherent in a sequential game.      

Optimizing the credit term decisions in supply chain finance

We study a credit term determination problem in the context of a supplier-buyer supply chain. The supplier's credit term decision is simultaneously made with its production and inventory decisions, and most importantly, it is impacted by the buyer's order quantity. We present a new game-theoretic framework to model this problem, which captures the interaction between the supplier's credit term decision and the buyer's order decision in a multi-period setting. An exact method based on nonlinear programming is implemented to obtain the optimal solutions. We apply our methodologies on a real world case. The computational results show that our approach significantly outperforms the heuristics with fixed credit terms, and either a short or a long credit term can be sub-optimal for the supplier in profitability. Our work offers the first data-driven model and solution approach that assists purchasing and supply managers to make optimal dynamic credit term decision in conjunction with production, ordering and inventory decisions in a game-theoretic setting.     

需求与生产成本扰动下的供应链最优定价订货模型

文章分析了供应链运作过程中由于突发事件引起的各种扰动,构建了由一个供应商和一个零售商组成的单周期单一产品供应链的Stackelberg博弈模型。在这个模型中,假设需求函数是指数函数,而生产成本函数为严格凸的两元一次函数,将订货量及其他影响生产成本的扰动因素引入模型,分析了不同情况下的供应链最优定价订货策略,并对各种结果进行了分析。结果表明,扰动发生后,供应链的定价、订货及收益均会发生变化。供应链将扰动带来的部分成本转嫁到消费者身上,供应商和零售商需要重新确立新的合作契约以确保供应链有序平稳的运行。     

Ambiguous Social Welfare Effects of Price Regulation Under Imperfect Competition

Conventional wisdom is that a binding price ceiling increases output and so increases social welfare if imposed on an imperfectly competitive market. However, this paper shows that a price ceiling can be harmful to social welfare even though it increases industry output and consumer surplus. This model can be applied to the pharmaceutical industry under price control in many countries, e.g., U.K., Canada, Germany and Japan.     

基于零售商促销的渠道协调及数量折扣契约设计

定量研究当零售商具有促销策略时的渠道协调。在此种情形下，渠道成员独立决策时线形契约无法促成渠道协调，通过博弈模型分析，给出一种协调数量折扣价格契约，并对渠道协调后的利润分配作了初步探讨。结果表明，制造商促使该类渠道达成协调的数量折扣有无穷多个，在一定条件下渠道成员双方利润均会增加，并给出了算例分析。同时根据数量折扣形式，对传统的“入场费”问题进行了再讨论，得出了“入场费”与渠道协调之间的关系，进而揭示出“入场费”在实践中深层含义。     

Market information and channel price structure

An analytical model is developed that considers the effect of demand information, and the precision with which demand forecasts are made, on channel profitability. Different channel price structures such as Stackelberg and Vertically integrated are considered and comparisons are made of the impact of information precision on channel profits under each structure. Other demand factors such as brand substitutability and share of base level demand are also included in the analysis, and the interaction of information and demand effects is examined. An empirical study is carried out using a sample of firms based in Hong Kong and support is found for the model propositions.