Incumbency preservation through electoral legislation: The case of the secret ballot

The secret ballot was designed to eliminate the incentive for candidates to purchase votes through direct vote buying. When voters have private information on their candidate preferences, incumbent candidates will generally be less efficient in purchasing votes than their challengers. Incumbent candidates may therefore benefit from the elimination of direct vote purchasing. Viewed in this vein, passage of secret ballot laws by state legislatures can be seen as an institutional mechanism to protect their incumbency advantage, rather than as an act of necessary electoral reform to create fair elections and protect democracy. Submitted: May 25, 1999 / Accepted: July 24, 2000     

The Meanings of ‘Yes’ and ‘No’. An Explanation for the Forbid/Allow Asymmetry

Survey questions worded with the verb ‘forbid’ prove not to elicit opposite answers to equivalent questions worded with the verb ‘allow’ (Rugg 1941). Although ‘forbid’ and ‘allow’ are generally considered each other’s counterparts, respondents rather answer ‘no, not forbid’ than ‘yes, allow’. In order to find out which question is a more valid measure of the underlying attitude, this asymmetry in the answers has to be explained. Experiments show that the asymmetry arises because respondents translate similar attitudes differently into the answering options to forbid/allow questions are equally valid, but the way the attitudes are expressed on the answering scale differs due to the use of ‘forbid’ or ‘allow’. How does this translation process work? The leading hypothesis in forbid/allow research predicts that respondents holding moderate opinions feel that ‘yes forbid’ and ‘yes allow’ are very extreme, causing moderate respondents to prefer answering ‘not forbid’, or ‘not allow’. This article presents the results of 10 experiments investigating the meanings of the answering options to forbid/allow questions. Extreme connotations are shown to only provide part of the explanation for the occurrence of the forbid/allow asymmetry. In order to describe the answering process for forbid/allow questions, well-definedness of meanings proves to be an important additional factor. The meanings of answering options to allow questions are ill-defined compared of those to forbid questions, which causes allow questions to be less homogeneous measures of the underlying attitude than forbid questions.     

地方政府投资中的冲动与拖延——中国经济过热的一个行为经济学解释

我国地方政府由于任期制等原因而形成"短视"认知偏差,过分注重项目的短期收益状况,从而会表现出对能带来大量即期收益的"政绩工程"类项目的投资冲动和对需要大量即期成本支付的环保类项目的投资拖延。以此可以部分地解析地方政府过度投资在我国历次经济过热中的作用机制。绿色GDP的提倡和一票否决制度作为中央政府对地方政府投资的反偏差干预手段,也可在此框架内得到统一的逻辑解释。     

Turnout and Closeness: Evidence from 60 Years of Bavarian Mayoral Elections

One prediction of the calculus of voting is that electoral closeness positively affects turnout via a higher probability of one vote being decisive. I test this theory with data on all mayoral elections in the German state of Bavaria between 1946 and 2009. Importantly, I use constitutionally prescribed two‐round elections to measure electoral closeness and thereby improve on existing work that mostly uses ex post measures that are prone to endogeneity. The results suggest that electoral closeness matters: a one standard deviation increase in closeness increases turnout by 1.27 percentage points, which corresponds to 1/7 of a standard deviation in this variable. I also evaluate how other factors such as electorate size or rain on election day affect turnout differentially depending on the closeness of the race. While rain decreases turnout on average, this effect is mitigated in close elections, as indicated by a positive interaction effect of the two variables.     

浅析村民选举中的投票与当选计票问题

村民自治的方式是四大民主,即民主选举、民主决策、民主管理和民主监督,其中,民主选举是前提和基础。在民主选举中,投票问题以及当选计票问题最为关键,直接影响着村民选举的成败与否。完善投票以及当选计票程序,对我国基层民主建设具有重要意义。     

论公共选择和经济选择的本质区别——基于多数规则下两种利益再分配的讨论

人类生活中同时存在着公共选择和经济选择,两者除原有已提出的共性外,还应补充多数规则这一共性。原有理论只重视两者的共性而忽视了它们的区别,或是仅将其区别归结为偏好是否一致的假设。其实两者的本质区别不在于选择者的偏好,而在于其支付能力的完全不同:公共选择是人口选票,而经济选择是资源选票。公共选择中是占人口少数的富人向占人口多数的穷人转移利益;经济选择中是持有少数资源的穷人向持有多数资源的富人转移利益。可见在同一多数规则下由于各自支付能力的不同,两者再分配发生的利益转移方向完全相反。两种选择因支付能力之不同产生两种不同的公平标准,每一个社会群体或利益集团,都是以自己占多数之选择领域的公平标准来要求其他领域的选择结果,这样就不可避免地产生抱怨和冲突。     

浅析村民选举中的投票与当选计票问题

村民自治的方式是四大民主,即民主选举、民主决策、民主管理和民主监督,其中,民主选举是前提和基础。在民主选举中,投票问题以及当选计票问题最为关键,直接影响着村民选举的成败与否。完善投票以及当选计票程序,对我国基层民主建设具有重要意义。