Experiments in Environmental Economics and Some Close Relatives

Abstract.  It is not only the great number of papers written on environment economics that make it worth dealing with this special branch of experimental research, but the environmental problem in all its facets seems to serve as a catalyst for identifying some methodological problems of the experimental method. For this reason, we will not only try to give an overview of recent experiments in environmental economics but also add some thoughts on the methodological implications of this work. We identify three direct connecting factors for the experimental method and environmental economics. First, social dilemmas are, in many cases, at the core of environmental problems. Experiments are able to test theoretical hypotheses for individual behavior in such social dilemma situations. The second connecting factor comes from the field of applied experimental work and can be characterized as the testbedding of institutional arrangements for the solution of environmental problems. The last direct application of experimental methods to environmental economics concerns the individual evaluation of environmental resources.     

我国农村集体土地所有权制度的困境与出路

农村集体土地所有权制度是我国土地权属制度的基本形式之一。长期以来围绕农村集体土地所有权问题实践中纠纷迭起,理论上争论纷纭。土地所有权的主体不明,土地所有权的权能弱化是当前我国农村集体土地所有权制度面临困境的主要原因。因此,在对当前各种改革思路具体分析和评价的基础上,提出摆脱目前我国农村集体土地所有权制度困境的根本出路:立法上明确规定以村为单位的农民集体为农村集体土地所有权的主体;设立村集体财产管理委员会代表村民集体行使村集体土地所有权和通过构建集体土地使用权制度来完善农村集体土地所有权。     

关于环保非政府组织发展的法律制度分析

相对发达国家的环保非政府组织而言,我国环保非政府组织显得先天不足,后天乏力,环保非政府组织自身的缺陷和尚不健全的法律体制是其发展滞后的重要原因,细致而有可操作性的法律制度才能形成对环保非政府组织的有力保障.     

On the evolutionary edge of altruism: a game-theoretic proof of Hamilton’s rule for a simple case of siblings

We offer a game-theoretic proof of Hamiltons rule for the spread of altruism. For a simple case of siblings, we show that the rule can be derived as the outcome of a one-shot prisoners dilemma game between siblings.JEL Classification: A13, C70, D64Correspondence to: Oded Stark, ZEF, University of Bonn, Walter-Flex-Strasse 3, 53113 Bonn, GermanyWe are indebted to an anonymous referee and to Uwe Cantner for helpful comments and suggestions. Partial financial support from the National Institute on Aging (grant RO1-AG13037) and from the Humboldt Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.     

Why Punish? Social reciprocity and the enforcement of prosocial norms

Recently economists have become interested in why people who face social dilemmas in the experimental lab use the seemingly incredible threat of punishment to deter free riding. Three theories with evolutionary microfoundations have been developed to explain punishment. We survey these theories and use behavioral data from surveys and experiments to show that the theory called social reciprocity in which people punish norm violators indiscriminately explains punishment best.JEL Classification: C91, C92, D64, H41 Correspondence to: Jeffrey P. CarpenterWe thank Carolyn Craven, Corinna Noelke and two referees for comments, and Middlebury College for financial assistance. In addition, Carpenter acknowledges the support of the National Science Foundation (SES-CAREER 0092953).     

The Year in Review: Economics at the Antitrust Division, 2005–2006

This paper covers the activities of the Economic Analysis Group (EAG) of the Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, during 2005–2006. It describes the economic analysis undertaken by EAG in several important investigations, appellate matters, and other activities as an advocate for competition.The views contained herein are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the U.S. Department of Justice.     

土地使用权转让法律规制的困境与出路

研究目的:分析当前土地使用权转让法律规制的困境,并探索其解决办法。研究方法:文义解释、目的解释与原理论证。研究结果:(1)刑法在规制土地使用权转让行为时需援引行政法的规定,在行政法规制密度过大的情况下容易导致非法转让、倒卖土地使用权罪的滥用,与民商法在违法性认定问题上也存在一定冲突;(2)基于文义解释、合宪分析和原理论证方法,不仅能准确界定刑法中土地使用权非法转让的具体范围,而且能消解不同部门法在违法性认定上的冲突。研究结论:《土地管理法》第七十四条和《刑法》第二百二十八条应作相应修改。     

浅谈城中村用电困局及解决措施

随着城市的迅猛发展,大量外来人口迁入各地城中村,导致城中村用电负荷暴增,残旧的城中村电网以及各种违法用电行为使得城中村用电陷入频繁停电的困局。该文通过对城中村用电现状的描述,分析造成用电困局的原因,并在此基础上提出破解城中村用电困局的若干建议。     

Discouraging Rainforest Transformation: An Ex-ante Policy Impact Analysis

Despite extensive efforts made by national and international certification agencies, Indonesian smallholder farmers’ participation in palm oil certification schemes adoption remains low. A fundamental obstacle is the smallholder practice of rainforest transformation into oil palm plantation which is forbidden by the agencies. In this context, we investigate three policies that could lead to a reduction in rainforest deforestation by smallholders: price premium on certified palm oil; the provision of environmental information; contributor recognition. In order to evaluate the influence of the policies ex-ante, we conduct a social dilemma experiment involving rubber and oil palm smallholders in Jambi Province, Sumatra, Indonesia. The findings indicate that the price premium and provision of context-specific environmental information could reduce rainforest transformation. However, a statistically significant effect of contributor recognition was not found.