合同非对称性、雇佣与企业所有权 |
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引用本文: | 徐风华,王俊杰.合同非对称性、雇佣与企业所有权[J].中南财经政法大学学报,2005,1(1):108-113. |
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作者姓名: | 徐风华 王俊杰 |
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作者单位: | 1. 北京大学,光华管理学院,北京,100871 2. 中国人民大学,商学院,北京,100872 |
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摘 要: | 企业是一种权力合同,其中存在两种非对称性:第一种非对称性是由于定价成本和风险成本不同导致的,是决定企业所有权非对称配置的基本依据;第二种非对称性是由于短缺方权力导致的,是决定企业所有权非对称配置的重要依据.雇佣关系是权力合同非对称性和企业所有权非对称配置的集中体现,因此正确理解雇佣关系是理解企业的基础.
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关 键 词: | 合同 非对称 企业所有权 |
文章编号: | 1003-5230(2005)01-0108-06 |
修稿时间: | 2004年9月21日 |
Asymmetry of the Contract, Hiring and Enterprise Ownership |
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Abstract: | Enterprises are a kind of power contract, among which there are two kinds of asymmetry. The first kind of asymmetry, basic basis of the of enterprise ownership, arises from different pricing cost and different risk cost of different product elements. The second kind of asymmetry, important basis of the asymmetric allocation of enterprise ownership, arises from the power of lacking product elements. The employer-employee relationship is a concentrating embodiment of asymmetric allocation of the power contract and the enterprise ownership, so it is the basis to understand enterprise to understand employment. |
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Keywords: | Contract Asymmetry Enterprise Ownership |
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