Investment and capital structure decisions with strategic debt service under asymmetric information |
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| Affiliation: | 1. School of Finance and Statistics, Hunan University, Changsha, China;2. School of Finance, Guangdong University of Foreign Studies, Guangzhou, China;3. Southern China Institute of Fortune Management Research, Guangzhou, China;1. Department of Business Administration, Fu Jen Catholic University, No. 510, Zhongzheng Rd., Xinzhuang Dist., New Taipei City 24205, Taiwan;2. Department of Business Administration, National Chin-Yi University of Technology, No. 57, Sec. 2, Zhongshan Rd., Taiping Dist., Taichung 41170, Taiwan;1. School of Finance, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, Chengdu, Sichuan, PR China;2. School of Economics and Management, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu, Sichuan, PR China;1. Department of Mathematical Sciences, Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST), Daejeon 34141, Republic of Korea;2. School of Business Administration, Ulsan National Institute of Science and Technology (UNIST), Ulsan 44919, Republic of Korea;1. ISCAL – Lisbon Accounting and Business School, Instituto Politécnico de Lisboa, Av. Miguel Bombarda, 20, 1069-035 Lisbon, Portugal;2. SOCIUS – Research Centre in Economic and Organizational Sociology, CSG – Research in Social Sciences and Management, Rua Miguel Lupi, 20, 1249-078 Lisbon, Portugal;3. ISEG – Lisbon School of Economics and Management, Universidade de Lisboa, Portugal;4. UECE – Research Unit on Complexity and Economics, Rua Miguel Lupi, 20, 1249-078 Lisbon, Portugal;1. Western Kentucky University, Bowling Green KY42101, USA;2. Utah Valley University, Orem, UT 84058, USA;3. Indiana Business Research Center, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405, USA |
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| Abstract: | This paper examines the agency problem due to manager-shareholder conflicts in a real option framework by incorporating strategic debt service. We show that when the equityholders’ bargaining power is weak, the optimal coupon is larger and the manager overinvests the project relative to the case without renegotiation, while the results are totally opposite when the bargaining power is strong. An increase in equityholders’ bargaining power reduces the manager’s value and the total social value. Especially, the social value can be improved by debt renegotiation when the systematic risk is high, which provides an explanation why Chinese government encourage the market-oriented debt restructuring. |
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| Keywords: | Investment and capital structure Strategic debt service Manager-shareholder conflicts G11 G32 |
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