| 民营企业集团“散财计划”的博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 韩鹏,唐家海.民营企业集团“散财计划”的博弈分析[J].华东经济管理,2005,19(10):62-63,88. |
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| 作者姓名： | 韩鹏 唐家海 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 武汉理工大学,管理学院,湖北,武汉,430070
2. 山东理工大学,远程教育学院,山东,淄博,255033 |
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| 摘 要： | 文章从完全信息动态博弈和完全信息静态博弈角度,对民营企业的“散财计划”问题进行了分析。作者认为民营企业集团董事长将自己拥有的股份部分转赠给中高层管理人员,是人力资本重要性凸现的必然要求,是民营企业向规范的公司治理结构变迁的必经阶段。
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| 关 键 词： | 散财计划 博弈 剩余索取权 |
| 文章编号： | 1007-5097（2005）10-0062-02 |
| 收稿时间： | 2005-07-18 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005-07-18 |
Game Analysis Based on "Distribute-fund Plan" in Private-owned Enterprise Groups |
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| HAN Peng,TANG Jia-hai.Game Analysis Based on "Distribute-fund Plan" in Private-owned Enterprise Groups[J].East China Economic Management,2005,19(10):62-63,88. |
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| Authors: | HAN Peng TANG Jia-hai |
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| Institution: | 1.Management College of Wuhan University of Technology,Wuhan 430070,China;2.Distance Education School,Shandong University of Technology,Zibo 255033,China) |
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| Abstract: | The paper has analysed 'distribute-fund plan' in private-owned enterprise groups from perfecting information dynamic game and perfect information static state game angle.The authors think that private-owned enterprise groups president give his own shares to middle and senior administrator,shows the manpower capital importance especially.It is the only stage that private-owned enterprise will become a normal company administration structure. |
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| Keywords: | distribute-fund plan game theory demand surplus right |
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