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Auctions with private uncertainty and resale opportunities
Authors:Philip A. Haile
Affiliation:Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1180 Observatory Drive, Madison, WI 53706, USA
Abstract:
When an auction is followed by an opportunity for resale, bidder valuations are endogenously determined, reflecting anticipated profit from buying/selling in the resale market. These valuations vary with the resale market structure, can differ across auction types, and may be lower or higher than if resale were impossible. Although resale introduces a common value element to the model, revenue equivalence can hold; when it fails, this is due not to affiliation but to differences in information conveyed to the secondary market. Information linkages between markets can also lead to signaling and, in some cases, preclude separation in the auction.
Keywords:D44   L1
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