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Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in a one-dimensional model of bargaining
Authors:Seok-ju Cho
Institution:a Department of Political Science, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627, USA
b Department of Economics, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627, USA
Abstract:We prove uniqueness of stationary equilibria in a one-dimensional model of bargaining with quadratic utilities, for an arbitrary common discount factor. For general concave utilities, we prove existence and uniqueness of a “minimal” stationary equilibrium and of a “maximal” stationary equilibrium. We provide an example of multiple stationary equilibria with concave (nonquadratic) utilities.
Keywords:D70  D72
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