Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments: a selective survey of the literature |
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Authors: | Ananish Chaudhuri |
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Institution: | 1.Department of Economics,University of Auckland,Auckland,New Zealand |
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Abstract: | I survey the literature post Ledyard (Handbook of Experimental Economics, ed. by J. Kagel, A. Roth, Chap. 2, Princeton, Princeton
University Press, 1995) on three related issues in linear public goods experiments: (1) conditional cooperation; (2) the role of costly monetary
punishments in sustaining cooperation and (3) the sustenance of cooperation via means other than such punishments. Many participants
in laboratory public goods experiments are “conditional cooperators” whose contributions to the public good are positively
correlated with their beliefs about the average group contribution. Conditional cooperators are often able to sustain high
contributions to the public good through costly monetary punishment of free-riders but also by other mechanisms such as expressions
of disapproval, advice giving and assortative matching. |
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Keywords: | |
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