| 独立审计质量的经济学分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 王岚.独立审计质量的经济学分析[J].财会通讯,2007(6). |
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| 作者姓名： | 王岚 |
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| 作者单位： | 西安石油大学经济管理学院 陕西西安 |
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| 摘 要： | 本文通过对审计质量的经济学分析,提出高质量的审计是增进契约效率的内生需要,中小股东和上市公司之间的“隐性契约”是推动审计质量提高的重要力量。我国特有的经济环境背景,决定了审计质量的提高存在着制度性障碍,审计质量是各方利益相互均衡的结果。
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| 关 键 词： | 审计质量 经济学分析 委托代理关系 契约效率 隐性契约 产权主体模糊 |
Economics Analysis of Audit Quality Independence |
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| Wang Lan.Economics Analysis of Audit Quality Independence[J].Communication of Finance and Accounting,2007(6). |
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| Authors: | Wang Lan |
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| Abstract: | Through the economics analysis of the audit-quality, the paper puts forward that the high-quality audit is the decisive factor of promoting the efficiency of the agreement, and the recessive agreement between the minority shareholders and the listed companies is the most significant factor of enhancing the audit-quality. Due to the peculiar settings of Chinese economic environment, there exists some institutional barriers in upgrading the audit-quality. The audit-quality is the result of the balance of mutual interests. |
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| Keywords: | Audit quality Economics analysis Trust agent relation Efficiency of the agreement Recessive agreement Fuzzy main part of property right |
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