What Have We Learned about the Employment Effects of Severance Pay? Further Iterations of Lazear Et al. |
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Authors: | John T Addison Paulino Teixeira |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Economics, University of South Carolina, 1705 College Street, Columbia, SC 29208, USA;(2) IZA, Bonn, Germany;(3) GEMF, Coimbra, Portugal;(4) Faculdade de Economia, Universidade de Coimbra and GEMF, Coimbra, Portugal |
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Abstract: | In this study we examine the effect of severance pay on employment and unemployment, using data on industrialized OECD countries.
Our starting point is Lazear’s (1990) Quarterly Journal of Economics 105, 699–726] dictum that severance payment requirements unfavorably impact the labor market. We extend his sample period and add to his parsimonious
specification a variety of fixed and time-varying labor market institutions. While the positive effect of severance pay on
unemployment garners some support, there is no real indication of adverse effects in respect of the other employment outcomes
identified here, namely, the employment-population ratio, the labor force participation rate, and long-term unemployment.
Moreover, with the possible exception of collective bargaining coordination, the role of institutions is also more muted than
suggested in the literature.
We thank, without implicating, an anonymous referee for most helpful comments on the first draft of this paper. |
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Keywords: | Severance pay employment protection employment unemployment labor force participation time-varying labor market institutions |
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