首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     


Contract Choice: Efficiency and Fairness in Revenue‐Sharing Contracts
Authors:Alexandros Karakostas  Axel Sonntag  Daniel John Zizzo
Affiliation:1. University of Erlangen‐Nuremberg, Nuremberg, Germany;2. University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria;3. Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne, UKAlso affiliated with the Behavioural and Experimental Northeast Cluster (BENC).
Abstract:We present a simple principal–agent experiment in which the principals are allowed to choose between a revenue‐sharing, a bonus, and a trust contract, to offer to an agent. Our findings suggest that a large majority of experimental subjects choose the revenue‐sharing contract. This choice turns out to be not only the most efficient but also, at the same time, fair. Overall, the distribution of earnings is only mildly skewed towards the principal. We conclude that, under revenue‐sharing contracts, concerns for fairness can be closely associated with the use of monetary incentives.
Keywords:Bonus contract  incentive contract  lab experiment  moral hazard  trust  C91  J41  M52
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号