Joint Ventures versus Contractual Agreements: An Empirical Investigation

In this paper, we empirically investigate the determinants of the governance form of strategic alliances. We use a database with 1,344 worldwide alliances in several industrial sectors. In contrast with previous empirical studies, we find that alliances undertaking R&D activities are more likely to use loose forms of organization (contractual agreements) than more hierarchical ones (joint ventures), and this result is even stronger when the alliance takes place in technologically sophisticated sectors. Moreover, we show that alliances between rival firms tend also to be organized with forms closer to arm’s length transactions. When the scope of an alliance is multidimensional or the alliance is an international one, however, firms prefer more hierarchical organizations such as joint ventures. This paper was partially written while the first author was visiting the University of the Basque Country. We would like to thank Reinhilde Veugelers and the project FWO spillovers 6.0131.98 at the Katholieke Universiteit of Leuven for the use of the K.U. database. Financial support from projects Progetto Giovani Ricercatori – 1999 Universitá di Udine, SEJ 2004-02172/ECON, 9/UPV 00035.321-13560/2001, UPV 00038.321-13503/2001 is gratefully acknowledged. We are also indebted to two anonymous referees for their helpful comments.