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| 中国证券市场监管的博弈分析 | |
| 引用本文： | 郝旭光,韩松,马俊,贺小刚. 中国证券市场监管的博弈分析[J]. 财经科学, 2012, 0(3): 10-18 |
| 作者姓名： | 郝旭光 韩松 马俊 贺小刚 |
| 作者单位： | 1. 对外经济贸易大学国际商学院,北京,100029 2. 中国人民大学经济学院,北京,100872 3. 包商银行战略部,包头,014030 |
| 基金项目： | 国家社会科学基金项目“中国资本市场监管有效性研究”(批准号05BJL028);中国人民大学科学研究基金(中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助)项目成果(项目编号10XNB023) |
| 摘 要： | 通过建立证监会、上市公司之间的博弈模型,分别利用一般的静态博弈和委托-代理模型研究其策略影响和监管效果。分析结果表明,上市公司出于自身利益最大化的目的,决定是否造假的因素有公司自身的财务状况、造假的预期收益和被查处的预期损失、证券市场造假的环境等。监管者实际监管的强度和对违规行为处罚的力度对于上市公司违规行为有着非常大的影响。 |
| 关 键 词： | 监管有效性 博弈论 均衡 激励相容 |
The Game Theory Analysis of the Regulation of Security Market in China |
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| Hao Xuguang , Han Song , Ma Jun , He Xiaogang. The Game Theory Analysis of the Regulation of Security Market in China[J]. Finance and Economics, 2012, 0(3): 10-18 | |
| Authors: | Hao Xuguang Han Song Ma Jun He Xiaogang |
| Abstract: | This paper Study on the optimal regulation in security market.We established the game model between the SFC and listed companies studied the impact of policies and regulatory effects by using Nash equilibrium and principal-agent Model.According to the results,the factors that determine whether listed companies fraud to maximize their own interests include their own financial situation,the expected return,the expected loss and the environment of stock market.The strength of regulation and punishment makes effective impact on the violations of listed companies. |
| Keywords: | Effectiveness of Regulation Game Theory Equilibrium Incentive Compatibility |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 万方数据 等数据库收录！ | |