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反商业贿赂与政府采购机制的完善
引用本文:陈晓春,张娟. 反商业贿赂与政府采购机制的完善[J]. 财经理论与实践, 2006, 27(5): 85-88
作者姓名:陈晓春  张娟
作者单位:湖南大学,政治与公共管理学院,湖南,长沙,410082
摘    要:
政府采购已成为财政支出的重要组成部分.巨大的利润空间给政府采购带来了商业贿赂的风险.运用成本-收益理论、政府规制俘获理论和公平理论,分析其产生的根源及可能带来的后果,可采取相应措施消除政府采购中商业贿赂因子的现实途径.

关 键 词:政府采购  商业贿赂  风险  途径
文章编号:1003-7217(2006)05-0085-04
收稿时间:2006-04-19
修稿时间:2006-04-19

Anti - commercial - bribery and the Perfection of Government Procurement Mechanism
CHEN Xiao-chun,ZHANG Juan. Anti - commercial - bribery and the Perfection of Government Procurement Mechanism[J]. The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics, 2006, 27(5): 85-88
Authors:CHEN Xiao-chun  ZHANG Juan
Affiliation:College of Pditical Affairs and Public Administer, Hunan University, Changsha, Hunan 410082,China
Abstract:
Government Procurement is becoming an important part of finance expenditure. The large profit of government procurement brings about largely risk of commerce bribe. This text analyzes its roots and outcomes, using the Cost - Profit theory, the Capture theory of regulation and the Justice theory, and analyzes the reality way to diminate commerce bribe in government procurement from eight different angles.
Keywords:Government Procurement   Commerce Bribe   Risk   Way
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