Unsettling aspects of voting theory |
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Authors: | Donald G Saari |
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Institution: | (1) Departments of Economics and Mathematics, University of California, Irvine, Irvine, CA 92697, USA (e-mail: dsaari@uci.edu) , US |
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Abstract: | Summary. Voting procedures are known to be plagued with a variety of difficulties such as strategic voting, or where a voter is rewarded
with a better election outcome by not voting, or where a winning candidate can lose by receiving more support. Once we know
that these problems can occur, the next objective should be to completely understand how, why, and where they arise. Namely,
for each election procedure, the new goal is to determine when such problems can occur, all voter types who can cause these
difficulties, and the actions they must take. This paper develops an easily used approach to handle all of these issues for
standard voting methods. New intuitive explanations for these various oddities follow from this approach.
Received: August 14, 2002 ; revised version: September 4, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*"My thanks to Richard Barrett and, in particular, to Hannu Nurmi for corrections, several useful comments, and suggestions
they made about earlier versions. Also, my thanks to a referee for calling some excellent references to my attention. An earlier
draft was presented at the 2002 Public Choice Society meeting. This research was supported by an NSF grant. |
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Keywords: | and Phrases: Strategic voting Monotonicity Voting paradoxes No-show paradox Positional voting |
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