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主从式二级供应链中的产品服务承担问题
引用本文:周娅, 陈珊珊, 任佩瑜,.主从式二级供应链中的产品服务承担问题[J].华东经济管理,2009,23(10):89-92.
作者姓名:周娅  陈珊珊  任佩瑜  
作者单位:四川大学,工商管理学院,四川,成都,610065
基金项目:国家自然科学基金项目 
摘    要:产品服务已成为企业获取市场竞争优势的有力武器。文章以企业利润最大化为出发点。运用Stackelberg博弈方法和微观经济理论,研究了单制造商单零售商的主从式二级供应链中产品服务承担方式的选择问题。分析结果表明,产品服务由制造商还是零售商承担这一决策与零售商和制造商的服务成本系数比值n密切相关。

关 键 词:委托代理  Stackelberg博弈  产品服务

The Problem of Assuming Product Service in a Master-slave Two-stages Supply Chain
ZHOU Ya; CHEN Shan-shan; REN Pei-yu.The Problem of Assuming Product Service in a Master-slave Two-stages Supply Chain[J].East China Economic Management,2009,23(10):89-92.
Authors:ZHOU Ya; CHEN Shan-shan; REN Pei-yu
Institution:School of Business and Management; Sichuan University; Chengdu 610065; China
Abstract:Product service has become a powerful weapon for an enterprise to get competitive power in market.With springboard of maximizing enterprise s profit,this paper applies stackelberg game and microeconomic theory to study the way of assuming product service in a master-slave two-stages supply chain that includes one manufacturer and one tradesman.The analytical result suggests that the decision-making whether the manufacturer or the tradesman should assume product service is nearly related to "n" which means t...
Keywords:agency by mandate  Stackelberg game  product service  
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