Overcoming the coordination problem: Dynamic formation of networks |
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Authors: | Jack Ochs |
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Institution: | a Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260, USA b Department of Economics, University of Bristol, Bristol, BS8 1TN, UK |
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Abstract: | We analyze a multi-period entry game among privately informed agents who differ with respect to the number of agents who must enter in order for their own entry to be profitable. In each period agents who have not yet joined decide whether to subscribe to a network. There exists a unique equilibrium that approximates any symmetric equilibrium arbitrarily closely as the discount factor approaches one. This resolves the coordination problem. Ex-post efficiency is necessarily achieved asymptotically as the population size grows large. These results do not hold if subscribers can reverse their decisions without cost. |
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Keywords: | D82 D85 |
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