Revenue ranking of first-price auctions with resale |
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| Authors: | Bernard Lebrun |
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| Institution: | Department of Economics, York University, 4700 Keele Street, Toronto, ON Canada M3J 1P3 |
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| Abstract: | When the price setter in post-auction resale is chosen according to exogenous probabilities, Hafalir and Krishna (2008) 2] showed that the first-price auction brings more expected revenues than the second-price auction with truth-bidding bidders. We complete their revenue ranking by proving that the first-price auction produces higher expected revenues the higher the probability the auction winner sets the resale price. |
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| Keywords: | D44 D82 |
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