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行业反倾销申诉——混合策略均衡下的后果及平衡的突破
引用本文:胡丹婷,何建华,史亚冲.行业反倾销申诉——混合策略均衡下的后果及平衡的突破[J].国际贸易问题,2006,288(12):49-52,77.
作者姓名:胡丹婷  何建华  史亚冲
作者单位:浙江理工大学,310018
摘    要:“入世”后,国内越来越多的产业遭受国外产品的倾销,然而只有极少数行业拿起反倾销的武器保护自己。文章在多人贡献博弈的框架下分析了行业反倾销申诉问题,得出在混合策略均衡下行业提起反倾销申诉的概率与总申诉成本收益比成反比关系、与厂商数量成反比关系,证明了行业协会参与是打破这种均衡并提高全行业福利的方法,并提出了提高产业集中度和加强行业协会建设的建议。

关 键 词:反倾销申诉  贡献博弈  混合策略  行业协会

Anti-dumping Appeal on Behalf of the Whole Industry
HU Dan-ting,HE Jian-hua,SHI Ya-chong.Anti-dumping Appeal on Behalf of the Whole Industry[J].Journal of International Trade,2006,288(12):49-52,77.
Authors:HU Dan-ting  HE Jian-hua  SHI Ya-chong
Institution:HU Dan-ting HE Jian-hua SHI Ya-chong
Abstract:More and more domestic industries suffer dumping after entering WTO. But only a few of industries take up the weapon of anti-dumping to protect themselves. This paper analyses the problem under multi-players contribution games framework. It is discovered that the possibility of industrial appeal rate have an inverse proportion relationship with both the number of players and the cost profit ratio of appealing. It is proved that the joint of industry association is the way to break equilibrium and improve total welfare. Finally the paper strongly suggests heightening the CR and perfect industry association's function.
Keywords:Anti-dumping appeal  Contribution games  Mixed strategy  Industry association
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