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A stability property in social choice theory |
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| Authors: | Donald E Campbell Jerry S Kelly Shaofang Qi |
| Institution: | 1. Department of Economics and The Program in Public Policy, The College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, VA, USA;2. Department of Economics, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, USA;3. School of Business and Economics Humboldt University Berlin, Berlin, Germany |
| Abstract: | A social choice function g is stable if whenever an alternative x is selected at profile u and then profile  is constructed from u by only switching x with yfor one individual i who has y just below x at u, then rule g selects either x or y at  and not some third alternative. Stability is strictly weaker than strategy‐proofness but strong enough to establish two kinds of impossibility theorems. |
| Keywords: | stability Pareto dictatorship tops‐only monotonicity plurality Condorcet maximin Borda |