| 上市公司股价与经理人薪酬合同设计 |
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| 引用本文： | 张建森,蒋露洲. 上市公司股价与经理人薪酬合同设计[J]. 经济理论与经济管理, 2002, 0(9): 47-52 |
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| 作者姓名： | 张建森 蒋露洲 |
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| 作者单位： | 复旦大学经济学院,上海,200433;复旦大学经济学院,上海,200433 |
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| 摘 要： | 在成熟规范市场,由于股票价格长期看能比较准确地反映企业的市场价值,所以股票价格可作为经理人的长期和综合的业绩度量指标。股票价格的主要激励工具为经理人期权和限制性股权,期权作为股票价格的非线性合同,能够带来更强的激励效率,适用于能力较高的经理人和质量较差的项目。
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| 关 键 词： | 股票价格 委托代理 经理人薪酬 |
| 文章编号： | 1000-596X(2002)09-0047-06 |
| 收稿时间： | 2002-07-31 |
| 修稿时间： | 2002-07-31 |
STOCK PRICES OF LISTED COMPANIES AND CONTRACT DESIGNING OF MANAGER SALARIES |
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| ZHANG Jian-sen,JIANG Lu-zhou. STOCK PRICES OF LISTED COMPANIES AND CONTRACT DESIGNING OF MANAGER SALARIES[J]. Economic Theory and Business Management, 2002, 0(9): 47-52 |
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| Authors: | ZHANG Jian-sen JIANG Lu-zhou |
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| Affiliation: | School of Economics, Fudan University, Shanghai 200433, China |
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| Abstract: | Since stock price can reflect the market value more correctly in the long run,it is often used to be the long-run performance measure,which makes the managerial incentive stocks or options to be restricted in the practice. In fact,the managerial options are the nonlinear compensation contracts with the stock price and can bring more strong incentive efficiency. Incentive options fit the situations of managers with higher level of ability and projects with worse quality. |
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| Keywords: | stock price agent-principal managerial compensation |
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