| Abstract: | The incidence of diverse forms of surplus – fixed rents, share rents, profits from direct cultivation and labour rents – remains a conundrum in the study of agrarian organization. The article presents a theoretical account of the form of rent when a dominant landowner faces landowning peasants. From a purely economic standpoint, the surplus-maximizing choice among forms is shown to be contingent not only on their incentive and labour-process characteristics but also on land inequality and labour productivity. By incorporating the difficulty of extracting effort from hired labour as a fixed parameter, political and ideological factors are accommodated as independent additional determinants of the form of agrarian organization. When there is also a class of landless labourers, sharecropping or labour-tying may prove superior to wage-leadership as a form of tacit collusion among dominant and subordinate landowners. Some of these forms of rent extraction are also shown to restrict the monopolist's incentive to adopt technical improvements. |
