不确定性与早期劳动合同 --契约理论的一个新发展

在劳动力市场上 ,劳动者和厂商未来的生产率都具有不确定性。早期劳动合同或签约由于一方面可以保证劳动者被排除在劳动力市场之外 ,同时也保证了厂商被排除在事后职位市场的风险之外 ,因而厂商和劳动者具有签订早期劳动合同的激励。尽管早期劳动合同或签约存在成本 ,但只要事前利益超过事后无效率的损失 ,那么早期劳动合同或签约就会发生。对于那些不能获得完全市场保险的人来说 ,签约是一种帕累托最优。早期劳动合同或签约是市场失灵的一种证明 ,早期劳动合同是一种不完全合同 ,也是一种非正式合同 ,它是对契约理论的一个发展。

Uncertainty and Early Labor Contract

On labor marker, there are the uncertainties about firms' and workers' future productivity. The early labor contract or unraveling partially insure workers against being shut out of the labor market, and also partially insure firms against the risks of being shut out of the ex post spot market, they have the incentives for early labor contract or unraveling. But there are costs of early labor contracts. Nonetheless, the ex ante benefits from insurance to participate exceed the ex post inefficient matching costs when unraveling occurs. Unraveling is Pareto optimal for those who participate when market-wide insurance is impossible to arrange. In this sense, like all externalities, unraveling or early labor contract is a manifestation of market failure or a "missing" market. The early contract is not only a kind of incomplete contract, but also a kind of informal contract, it is a new development of the contract theory.