政府引导基金下基金经理人薪酬激励机制研究

在风险企业家、创业基金经理人、投资者的三方动态博弈中,信息不对称可能导致基金经理人的道德风险问题。以委托代理理论为基础,研究政府引导基金下如何有效地设计基金经理人的薪酬激励机制;并通过委托代理模型的推导,探讨影响基金经理人激励强度的各种因素,从而为政府引导基金顺利、高效的运作提供承上启下的保障。

The Study on Fund Managers＇ Compensation Incentive Mechanisms under Government Leading Fund

In the tripartite dynamic game among entrepreneurs,venture capital fund managers and investors,the information asymmetry may lead to the problem of moral hazard from fund managers.This paper is based on the principal-agent theory to study how to design the effective pay system of fund managers under the government leading fund of venture capital and through the principal-agent model to explore the factors which affect motivating strength of fund managers,so as to give the government leading fund of venture capital a signaling and linking protection that make it operates smoothly and efficiently.