合谋操纵与散户跟风的演化博弈分析

本文通过构造一个合谋操纵和散户跟风的双种群双策略的演化博弈模型,从规范经济学角度研究了合谋账户与散户之间的演化博弈,分析了合谋操纵者何时会选择操纵、散户是否会跟风、监管对市场操纵的影响以及市场环境如何影响合谋操纵者和散户的行为等问题。为追求利益最大化,拥有资金优势的合谋者具有操纵市场的动机;合谋者操纵市场行为损害了一些跟风散户的利益,一定程度上也会减少散户跟风。基于此,本文认为,应当通过完善法制,保持监管高压态势,加强投资者教育和投资者适当性管理,完善套利制度等,应对合谋操纵和散户跟风行为。

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Collusion Manipulation and Retails Following the Trend

By constructing a double groups’ and double strategies’ evolutionary game model about collusion manipulation and retails following the trend,this paper studies the evolutionary game between collusion securities accounts and retails from the view of normative economics,and analyze the problems of when collusion securities accounts choose to manipulate,whether retails follow the trend,how securities supervision influences manipulations,and how collusion securities accounts and retails are influenced by the market environment.In order to maximize the interests,collusion manipulators with financial advantage have the motivation to manipulate the market,and as their behavior damages the interests of retail investors which following the trend,the number of following the trend will be reduced to some extent.Based on this,the author thinks that we should cope with the problems of collusion manipulation and retails following the trend by completing legal and arbitrage systems,strengthening securities supervision,and improving investors education and investors appropriation management.