有效会计监管的均衡模型

会计欺诈已经成为世界范围内的重大问题 ,它给世界经济带来了重大的负面影响。本文通过建立两阶段动态博弈模型并对其求解发现 ,会计规则执行者的违规程度与惩罚力度、执行者的贴现因子以及政府的监管概率成反比 ;而政府的会计监管力度与惩罚力度、执行者贴现因子的平方以及政府的监管成本成反比。政府的最优事后会计监管的合适目标并不是要杜绝会计规则执行者的会计欺诈行为 ,而是将部分会计规则执行者的会计欺诈行为控制在一定的范围之内 ;最优的会计监管对于控制很看中当期收益的会计规则执行者的会计欺诈行为来说无能为力 ,控制这类会计欺诈行为的唯一措施在于提高会计监管的时效性 ;有效会计监管需要额外成本 ;并且有效会计监管实施的基本条件存在优先次序 :首先区分不同类型的会计规则执行者 ,其次区分会计规则执行者所承担的他们真正能够感知的违规处罚 ,然后才是选择最优的监管力度。

Effective Accounting Supervision:an Equilibrium Model

Accounting fraud has become one of the most serious economic problems because of its tremendous negative effect on the economy. Through solving a two-stage dynamic game, the paper shows that the government's ex-post accounting supervision should aim to control the violation of accounting rule to an appropriate level rather than completely eliminating it. The ordinary ex-post accounting supervision system fails for those violators with high discount rate. The only effective method to this kind violation is to shorten the time lag. An effective accounting supervision system should consider the difference among executors first, then pay attention to their sensitivities to the penalty, and lastly determine the optimal accounting supervision level.