Strategic restraint in contests |
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Authors: | Gil S Epstein Shmuel Nitzan |
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Institution: | a Department of Economics, Bar-Ilan University, 52900 Ramat-Gan, Israel b Center for Economic Policy Research, London, UK c IZA, Bonn, Germany |
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Abstract: | Economic policy is modelled as the outcome of a (political) game between two interest groups. The possible ex-post (realized) outcomes in the game correspond to the proposed policies. In the literature policy proposals are exogenous. We extend such games by allowing the endogenous determination of the proposed policies. In a first stage the groups decide which policy to lobby for and then, in a second stage, engage in a contest over the proposed policies. Our main result is that competition over endogenously determined policies induces strategic restraint that reduces polarization and, in turn, wasteful lobbying activities. |
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Keywords: | D72 |
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