大股东掠夺:公司治理新焦点

传统委托代理理论以股权分散的美、英等国公司为主要研究对象,因此,其研究的焦点是经理层与股东之间的关系,而很少研究大股东与中小股东之间的关系。然而,大量证据表明,各国公司股权结构的普遍特征已是高度集中或相对集中,而不再是传统理论视角下的股权分散。股权集中时,大股东的角色由“援助之手”偏向“攫取之手”。越来越严重的大股东掠夺行为也成为各国公司治理中最尖锐的问题之一。这种变化需要新的公司治理分析视角和分析框架。在吸收大量文献成果的基础上,本文对大股东掠夺行为的产生背景、产生原因、常见手段及防范措施进行了详细分析。

Tunneling of Majority Shareholders:a New Focus of Corporate Governance

Western traditional principal-agent theory focused on the relationship between managers and shareholders.It made little research on the relationships betweenmajorityshareholders and minority or medium shareholders.However,more andmore evidence proved that modern companies' equity had not been diversified but concentrated.Majority shareholders acted as the role of "Grabbing Hand" more than "Helping Hand".More and more serious tunneling of majority shareholders became one of the most serious governance problems of listed companies.This change requires new analysis approach and framework.On the basis of abundant literature,this paper analyzes in detail the background,reasons,means of and preventive measures against the tunneling of majority shareholders.