Environmental Regulations Under Simple Negligence or Strict Liability |
| |
Authors: | Henry van Egteren R Todd Smith |
| |
Institution: | (1) Department of Economics, 8–14 Tory, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada, T6G 2H4 |
| |
Abstract: | We use negligence and strict liability as the basis for environmentalregulations and show that, when jurisdictions compete for firms that engagein environmentally risky behaviour, strict liability implements the sociallyoptimal outcome while simple negligence does not, even if the jurisdictionsfully cooperate in setting standards of care. Consequently, we argue that,even if jurisdictions delegate standard setting to a central authority, likein the European Union, this would not implement the socially optimaloutcome. We also demonstrate that harmonization of environmental regulationsmakes more sense if strict liability is used rather than simple negligence. |
| |
Keywords: | authority liability negligence risky behaviour |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|