| 会计制度变迁的寻租博弈 |
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| 引用本文： | 彭数学.会计制度变迁的寻租博弈[J].审计与经济研究,2007,22(2):72-76. |
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| 作者姓名： | 彭数学 |
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| 作者单位： | 仰恩大学,会计系,福建,泉州,362014 |
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| 摘 要： | 会计制度作为一种公共物品，具有经济后果。其变迁的过程会诱发各相关利益集团的寻租博弈活动。经过充分博弈后，会计制度会达成纳什均衡，并且一旦出现新的诱因，又会引发新的寻租博弈活动，如此反复循环，向会计制度的理想状态——帕累托均衡逼近，实现社会资源的最优配置。
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| 关 键 词： | 会计制度变迁 公共物品 寻租博弈 帕累托均衡 |
| 文章编号： | 24235943 |
| 修稿时间： | 02 5 2007 12:00AM |
Rent-seeking and Game in the Evolution of Accounting Systems |
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| PENG Shu-xue.Rent-seeking and Game in the Evolution of Accounting Systems[J].Economy & Audit Study,2007,22(2):72-76. |
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| Authors: | PENG Shu-xue |
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| Institution: | Department of Accounting, Yang En University, Quanzhou 362014, China |
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| Abstract: | The accounting systems has economic consequences as a kind of public goods. The course of its changes will bring out rentseeking and game of the relevant interested parties. After an abundant game, accounting systems will reach Nash equilibrium and recur because of the new inducement, reaching the ideal of accounting system-Pareto equilibrium to realize the optimal disposition of social resources. |
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| Keywords: | evolution of accounting systems public goods rent-seeking and game Pareto equilibrium |
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