Collective bargaining under perfect information. The negotiation of national agreements

We structurally estimate a perfect information bargaining model of collective negotiations using data on national agreements for Spain. The model is a stochastic model of sequential bargaining in which we allow for the possibility of negotiations ending without agreement, a common feature in the data. Delays in equilibrium are the result of uncertainty about the surplus to be divided among the players and not of information asymmetries. The model fits the data well regardless of the limitations imposed by the parametric specification adopted. Our results show that agents are patient and that the advantage from proposing is large.JEL Classification: J50, C73, C78We thank Fabian Marquez, Sergio Santillan and Jose Maria Zufiaur for helping us to create the data base on Spanish National Agreements. We also thank Cesar Alonso, Juanjo Dolado, Gautam Gowrisankaran, Maia Guell, Antonio Merlo and participants at the 1999 European Meeting of the Econometric Society for very helpful comments. Jose E. Galdon thanks financial support from the following institutions: European Commission for a TMR Marie Curie Fellowship, Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnologia for project BEC2002-00954 and Spanish Ministerio de Educacion, Cultura y Deporte for project PR2004-0057. He also thanks the hospitality of STICERD (LSE) and the IR Section (Princeton University) where part of this work was completed. The usual disclaimers apply.