| 基于进化博弈的战略网络节点间信任关系研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 阮平南,杨丹. 基于进化博弈的战略网络节点间信任关系研究[J]. 改革与战略, 2009, 25(1): 54-56 |
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| 作者姓名： | 阮平南 杨丹 |
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| 作者单位： | 北京工业大学经济与管理学院,北京,100124 |
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| 摘 要： | 信任是战略网络生存和进化的基础，对战略网络的治理有重要作用。文章从信任博弈双方的有限理性出发，建立战略网络节点间信任行为的进化博弈模型，并分析博弈双方的进化稳定策略。进化博弈的稳定策略分析结果说明，节点企业为了实现长期利益，最优的策略选择就是提高彼此间的信任度。
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| 关 键 词： | 战略网络 信任 进化博弈 进化稳定策略 |
Evolutionary Game in Trust Relationship of Nodes in a Strategic Network |
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| Ruan Pingnan,Yang Dan. Evolutionary Game in Trust Relationship of Nodes in a Strategic Network[J]. Reformation & Strategy, 2009, 25(1): 54-56 |
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| Authors: | Ruan Pingnan Yang Dan |
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| Affiliation: | Economic and Management College;Beijing University of Technology;Beijing 100124 |
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| Abstract: | Trust is the basic of survival and evolutionary of a strategic network and it plays an important role in the development of a strategic network.Based on the bounded rationality of the game players in trust game, the paper builds an evolutionary game model in nodes of a strategic network and analyses the evolutionarily stable strategy of the game players.By the evolutionarily stable strategy of the evolutionary game model, we conclude that node enterprises' optimal strategy is to improve the trust degree in ... |
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| Keywords: | strategic network trust evolutionary game theory evolutionarily stable strategy （ESS） |
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