空间双寡头竞争下的创新扩散——基于博弈论的模型

关于创新空间扩散的研究一直没有关注空间竞争对于创新采纳的影响.本文在双人博弈的框架下构建了一个空间双寡头竞争模型,假定厂商已经拥有关于创新的信息,单纯地考察空间竞争对于创新采纳的影响.结果表明,即使同质的厂商同时获得了创新的信息,在竞争的作用下,创新的采纳很少会同时进行.先采纳者具有先发优势,且随着运费率的下降,先发优势愈发得以强化.本文还分析了空间竞争和技术扩散反梯度现象间的关系,结论是空间竞争至少是反梯度现象产生的一个原因.

Innovation Diffusion in A Spatial Duopoly: A Game Theoretic Model

Literatures on spatial innovation diffusion pay no attention on the effect of spatial competition. The paper create a game theoretic model in a spatial duopoly, supposing two firms obtain the same information of an innovation and analyzing the influence of spatial competition on the adoption. The results show that under the competition innovation adoption hardly happen simultaneously in spite of the same information reaching the homogeneous firms simultaneously. The first adopter will gain the advantages, and the lower the freight rate, the stronger the advantages. Moreover, the model is used to analyze the relationship between spatial competition and anti-gradient diffusion of technology, drawing the conclusion that spatial competition may result in the anti-gradient technological diffusion.