| 从委托代理理论看供应链合作伙伴的激励 |
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| 引用本文： | 张建儒,何敏飞.从委托代理理论看供应链合作伙伴的激励[J].商业研究,2006,46(17):65-67. |
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| 作者姓名： | 张建儒 何敏飞 |
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| 作者单位： | 西安建筑科技大学,管理学院,陕西,西安,710055 |
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| 摘 要： | 供应链是一个由许多不同利益集团组成的动态变化的系统,其中各企业之间由于信息不对称存在着委托代理关系,如何协调这种关系,并处理好各利益成员之间的激励问题是供应链管理的主要问题之一。解决这一问题的根本途径就是制定有效的激励机制,处理好供应链各组成企业之间由于信息不对称引起的委托代理关系,充分发挥供应链的整体优势。
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| 关 键 词： | 委托代理 供应链 激励 |
| 文章编号： | 1001-148X（2006）17-0065-03 |
| 收稿时间： | 2005-12-15 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005年12月15 |
The Incentive of Participants of Supply Chain Based on Principal-agent Theory |
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| ZHANG Jian-ru,HE Min-fei.The Incentive of Participants of Supply Chain Based on Principal-agent Theory[J].Commercial Research,2006,46(17):65-67. |
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| Authors: | ZHANG Jian-ru HE Min-fei |
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| Abstract: | Supply-chain is a dynamic system made up of many interests groups.There are prihcipal-agent relationship among them with asymmetric information.How to coordinate the relationship and incite the members becomes one of the main problems in supply-chain management.The paper suggest that this problems should be solved by making effective incentive system for those participants of supply chain,fully exerting the advantages of supply chain as an integrity to adjust that principal-agent relationship. |
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| Keywords: | principal-agent relationship supply-chain intentive |
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