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Evidence of Information Asymmetries in the Market for Residential Condominiums
Authors:Ronald C Rutherford  Thomas M Springer  Abdullah Yavas
Institution:(1) University of Texas-San Antonio, San Antonio, TX 78249, USA;(2) Clemson University, Clemson, SC 29634, USA;(3) Smeal College of Business, The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA 16802, USA
Abstract:Previous research (Rutherford et al. 2005; Levitt and Syverson 2005) identify and quantify agency problems in the brokerage of single-family houses. Real estate agents are found to receive a premium when selling their own houses in comparison to similar client-owned houses. Given the homogeneity of the condominium market in comparison to the single-family house market, we use a large sample of condominium transactions to examine if agency problems exist in the condominium market. Controlling for sample selection and endogeneity bias of the data, we find evidence for a similar price premium for agent-owned condominiums. In contrast to the results for single-family houses in the same geographic market, we find that agent-owned condominiums must stay on the market longer to receive a higher price.
Contact Information Abdullah YavasEmail:
Keywords:Real estate agents  Condominium market  Single-family house market
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