审计机关组织模式和审计效果——以规制俘获理论为研究视角

审计机关组织模式有两种,一是纵向集权/横向集中模式,二是纵向集权/横向分割模式。将国家审计作为审计规制,以规制经济学为基础,建立一个解释两种审计机关组织模式下审计效果之差别的理论架构,并用这个理论架构来分析湘潭市审计局的审计"四权分离"模式。结果表明,在纵向集权/横向集中模式下,审计主体被俘获的可能性较大;在纵向集权/横向分割模式下,审计主体被俘获的可能性较小。将审计立项权、审计查证权、审计审理权、审计执行权进行横向分割,具有解决信息不对称、权力分割和权力监督三方面的效果,能够发挥审计规制俘获阻止的功能。湘潭市审计局推行审计权"四分离"的组织模式实现了从纵向集权/横向集中模式向纵向集权/横向分割模式的转换,从而大大降低了审计规制俘获,提高了审计效果。

Organization Models of Audit Institutions,and Audit Effect:From the Perspective of Capture of Regulation

Based on the allocation of audit power,there are two organization models for national audit office,one is VCP/ HCP,the other is VCP/ HSP.This paper takes nation audit office as a regulation based on regulation economics;establishes a theoretical framework to explain why VCP/ HSP model is more difficult to be captured than VCP/ HCP model.And further,uses this theoretical framework to explain why Xiangtan audit office changes its organization model with effect.Under the VCP/ HSP model,audit powers are separated,in this way,they are able to reduce the information asymmetry,to realize the separation of powers and supervision of power,and prevent the capture of regulation,as a result,the audit effect is improved.