企业职工养老保险制度研究——从现收现付制度到基金积累制的制度优化分析

我国企业职工养老保险制度运行不畅的主要原因在于从现收现付制向基金积累制改革中,转制成本承担主体模糊,进而导致出现各级政府逃避承担转制成本、企业缴费积极性不高、个人账户亏空等相关利益主体"趋利避害"的策略性行为。促进企业职工养老保险制度良性运行,需要科学应对政府与企业的博弈、企业与企业的博弈、政府与个人的博弈,并在此基础上推出政府承担转制成本、对企业缴纳社会统筹养老基金实行优惠政策、促进个人账户实账化等关键措施。

Study on Endowment Insurance System for Enterprise Employees --Analysis on System Optimization from Pay-As-you-Go System to Funded System

The endowment insurance system for enterprise employees in China has not operated favorably since in the reform from pay-as-you-go system to funded system,the main body assuming transition costs blurred.Thus,relevant interest bodies’ inclined strategic behaviors like governments at all levels evade transition costs,enterprises pay endowment insurance unwillingly and individual accounts are in debt,etc.In order to promote benign operation of endowment insurance system for enterprise employees,it is necessary to respond scientifically to the game between governments and enterprises,to the game among enterprises and to the game between governments and individuals.On this basis,key measures like governments assume transition costs,preferential policies for enterprises paying social pooling endowment fund and promotion of real individual accounts,etc.