公共文化PPP项目中承包商机会主义行为奖惩机制演化博弈

在公共文化PPP项目管理模式中,承包商为了追求自身利益在一定情况下可能会选择利用不对称信息采取机会主义行为转移项目利益,这将会损害政府建设单位的利益,影响公众的享受公共文化服务的权利,扰乱政府建设市场,因此建设单位需采取一定的管理手段来抑制承包商的机会主义行为。运用演化博弈理论分析政府建设单位应对承包商机会主义行为的演化路径,分别建立惩罚机制和补偿机制2种状态下的演化博弈模型,分别探究甲乙双方在惩罚机制和补偿机制下的演化均衡策略。结果表明,惩罚机制并未对承包商机会主义行为产生实质性的抑制效果,而补偿机制在一定条件下可显著影响承包商的机会主义行为。基于此,政府建设单位可充分利用补偿机制手段应对承包商的机会主义行为。

Study on subsidy-punishment mechanism of contractors' opportunistic behaviors in public cultural PPP projects

In public cultural PPP projects,contractors may choose to make use of asymmetric information to take opportunistic behaviors in some cases to pursue their benefits,which would be harmful to the owner's interests and to the rights of the public to enjoy public culture and would even disrupt government construction market.So,the owner should take certain management tools to inhibit contractors' opportunistic behaviors.The evolutionary game theory is adopted to analyze the strategies of evolutionary equilibrium within both punishment mechanism and subsidy mechanism.The game theory is mainly used to analyze respectively the inhibitory effects of punishment mechanism and subsidy mechanism to opportunistic behaviors.The results show that punishment mechanism cannot inhibit contractors' opportunistic behaviors substantively,while subsidy mechanism can significantly affect contractors' behaviors in some cases.Based on this,the owner can make full use of subsidy mechanism to cope with contractors' opportunistic behaviors.