| “过度医疗”的制度根源与医生声誉激励机制 |
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| 引用本文： | 唐要家,王广凤.“过度医疗”的制度根源与医生声誉激励机制[J].中南财经政法大学学报,2008(4). |
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| 作者姓名： | 唐要家 王广凤 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 浙江财经学院,经贸学院,浙江,杭州310018
2. 河北理工大学,经济管理学院,河北,唐山,063009 |
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| 基金项目： | 教育部人文社会科学研究基地基金 |
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| 摘 要： | 近年来,"看病贵"成为我国医疗服务中的突出问题,导致"看病贵"的一个直接推动因素是医疗服务中的"过度医疗"问题。医疗服务具有显著的信息不对称特征,在此背景下会形成医患之间合约谈判权的非对称分布,形成"权责不对等"的"委托困境"问题,从而引发"过度医疗"和医疗市场中"富人驱逐穷人"的现象。在此情况下,政府管制并不能改变医患之间合约谈判权的非对称分布格局,解决过度医疗问题的核心应该是建立以医生声誉激励机制为核心的制度体系。
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| 关 键 词： | 医患关系 过度医疗 声誉机制 |
The Institutional Analysis of Excessive Medical Care and Incentive Mechanisms Designed to Doctors |
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| TANG Yao-jia,WANG Guang-feng.The Institutional Analysis of Excessive Medical Care and Incentive Mechanisms Designed to Doctors[J].Journal of Zhongnan University of Finance and Economics,2008(4). |
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| Authors: | TANG Yao-jia WANG Guang-feng |
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| Abstract: | The higher price of medical care in China is an important problem,the excessive medical care play an important role to price increasing of it.Because of asymmetrical information in medical care,the opportunity behaviors of doctors can provide excessive medical care to get some gains.Under this condition,designing effective reputation incentive mechanisms will improve the performance of medical care. |
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| Keywords: | Relation of Doctor and Patient Excessive Medical Care Reputation Incentive Mechanisms |
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