Opportunism in labour contracting: An application of the ‘organisational failures’ framework |
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Authors: | Paul Willman |
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Affiliation: | Imperial College, London SW7 2PG, UK |
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Abstract: | The ‘Markets and Hierarchies’ framework provides a basis for the analysis of employment relations. However, it fails to take the possibility of bilateral opportunism into account and in consequence exaggerates the ease of obtaining consummate cooperation. Once bilateral opportunism is admitted, the resolution of contractual problems becomes indeterminate, depending upon the preference and relative power of the parties. These preferences can be modelled,analysis of technological change issues reveals that such a model has some explanatory power. The implication of this approach is that the removal of opportunism implies relatively organisational surgery. |
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