Loose with the Truth: Predicting Deception in Negotiation

Using a simulated, two-party negotiation, we examined how characteristics of the actor, target, and situation affected deception. To trigger deception, we used an issue that had no value for one of the two parties (indifference issue). We found support for an opportunistic betrayal model of deception: deception increased when the other party was perceived as benevolent, trustworthy, and as having integrity. Negotiators’ goals also affected the use of deception. Individualistic, cooperative, and mixed dyads responded differently to information about the other party’s trustworthiness, benevolence, and integrity when deciding to either misrepresent or leverage their indifference issue. Mixed dyads displayed opportunistic betrayal. Negotiators in all-cooperative and all-individualistic dyads used different information in deciding whether to leverage their indifference issues and used the same information (benevolence) differently in deciding whether to misrepresent the value of their indifference issue. Mara Olekalns is a Professor of Management (Negotiations) at the Melbourne Business School, University of Melbourne. Her research focuses on communication processes in negotiation. In her research, she has investigated how strategy sequences shape negotiation outcomes. She is extending this research to investigate how impressions and communication shape trust in negotiation. Her work on communication processes in negotiation has been published in Journal of Applied Psychology, Human Communication Research, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, and Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. Philip L. Smith is a Professor in the Department of Psychology, University of Melbourne. His primary research interest is in building quantitative models of the human visual system. He also applies his modeling expertise to analyses of communication processes in negotiation, focusing on the relationships between situational and dispositional factors, strategy sequences and negotiation outcomes. It has been published in leading management and psychology journals, including Human Communication Research, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, and Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. Authors' Note The research reported in this paper was supported by a Discovery Grant from the Australian Research Council. We thank Ania Ratzik and Rudi Crncec for assistance with data coding. Correspondence should be addressed to Mara Olekalns, Melbourne Business School, University of Melbourne, 200 Leicester St, Carlton, Victoria, 3053, Australia or via email to m.olekalns@mbs.edu