| 派驻财务总监与企业集团内控的实施--基于代理理论的视角 |
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| 引用本文： | 苏静. 派驻财务总监与企业集团内控的实施--基于代理理论的视角[J]. 会计研究, 2006, 27(1): 63-68 |
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| 作者姓名： | 苏静 |
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| 作者单位： | 清华大学经济管理学院,100084 |
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| 摘 要： | 母公司通常会向控股子公司派驻财务总监,并授权其监督报告子公司的财务状况。这种机制实际上是一种企业集团内部代理层的设置问题。本文在代理理论的基础上,设计了一个由母公司(委托人P)、子公司管理层(代理人A)和派出的财务总监(代理人CFO)组成的双层代理模型,试图解释向子公司派驻财务总监的作用机制和失灵原因。
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| 关 键 词： | 财务总监委派 集团内控 代理理论 |
Effectiveness of Internal Control Mechanism for Subsidiary Company and its CFO: on Principal-Agent Perspective |
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| Su Jing. Effectiveness of Internal Control Mechanism for Subsidiary Company and its CFO: on Principal-Agent Perspective[J]. Accounting Research, 2006, 27(1): 63-68 |
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| Authors: | Su Jing |
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| Abstract: | Parent company usually appoints CFO to its holding subsidiaries to monitor their financial results.This mechanism focus on the arrangement of layers of the hierarchy structure to alleviate principal agent problems.We develop a two layers model,which comprises a parent company(ie.Principle),top management and CFO of subsidiary(ie.two layers of agents),to illustrate the effectiveness of the internal control mechanism of the hierarchy structure within a group enterprise. |
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