论上市公司财务报告的管制

管制论基于市场失灵和公平问题，提出应当对上市公司的信息披露进行管制，并对虚假陈述和内幕交易行为进行惩罚。非管制论从代理理论和信号传递理论出发，认为管理当局有自愿提供真实信息的动机，对信息披露进行强制性要求没有多大意义。从上市公司实际情况看，管理当局会在造假的成本与效益之间进行权衡，如果造假成本低于收益，将会发生欺诈行为，从而损害投资者利益。因此，应当对财务报告进行管制，并追究虚假陈述行为的法律责任，但管制应当适度。

On the Regulation of Financial Reporting of Listed Corporations

Against market failure and for the sake of equity, the advocators of regulation think it necessary to impose regulation on information disclosure of the listed corporations and to inflict punishment on false statement and insider trading. The advocators of deregulation, based on the agency theory and signaling theory, believe that since the management has the intention to willingly provide the real information, it would not be of much significance to make compulsory requirement to the information disclosure. This essay suggests that the management, the provider of financial report, would be weighing between the cost and benefit of their misrepresentation. If the cost is lower than the benefit, fraudulent practices would occur. Therefore, financial reporting should be brought under regulation; false statement should be prosecuted under law. The regulation, however, should be properly conducted.