| 上市公司CEO的监管机制：一个三方博弈视觉的思考 |
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| 引用本文： | 郭晖,骆品亮.上市公司CEO的监管机制：一个三方博弈视觉的思考[J].上海管理科学,2005,27(3):27-29. |
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| 作者姓名： | 郭晖 骆品亮 |
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| 作者单位： | 复旦大学管理学院
(郭晖)，复旦大学管理学院产业经济学系(骆品亮) |
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| 基金项目： | 本文受国家自然科学基金项目(70271009)与上海市高校优秀青年教师后备人选科研项目(03YQHB014)资助. |
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| 摘 要： | 所有权与经营权的分离是现代企业的基本特征,内部人控制问题已成为制约上市公司健康稳定发展的瓶颈因素。本文通过建立一个CEO、董事会和外部监管机构三方之间的博弈模型,强调了监管的重要性;并从完善董事会职能和加强外部监管力度两个方面对上市公司CEO的道德风险之监管提出合理性建议。
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| 关 键 词： | CEO 道德风险 监管机制 博弈 |
Governance Structure for CEO of Listed Companies:Perspectives from a 3-Person Game |
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| Guo Hui,LUO Pin-liang.Governance Structure for CEO of Listed Companies:Perspectives from a 3-Person Game[J].Shanghai Managent Science,2005,27(3):27-29. |
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| Authors: | Guo Hui LUO Pin-liang |
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| Abstract: | The separation of the right of management and the right of ownership is the basic character of the modern corporation. "Internal control" has become the biggest obstacle for the development of the listed companies healthily and steadily. After setting up a game of three partners included CEO, director and external monitoring institution, we emphasize the importance of monitoring. Furthermore, from the two aspects including perfect the effect of the board of director and strengthen the external monitoring, we put forward some feasible advice for monitoring the CEO s moral hazard. |
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| Keywords: | CEO moral hazard Monitoring Mechanisms Game |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
