Management succession and financial performance of family controlled firms

This paper examines the immediate and long-term impacts on financial performance of 124 management successions within Canadian family controlled firms. When family successors are appointed, stock prices decline by 3.20% during the 3-day (−1 to +1) event window, whereas there is no significant decrease when either non-family insiders or outsiders are appointed. However, a cross-sectional analysis indicates that the negative stock market reaction to family successors is related to their relatively young age which may reflect a lack of management experience rather than their family connection per se. Investors are uncertain about the “management quality” of family successors who have less established reputations than more seasoned non-family insiders and outsiders. Non-family member appointments tend to follow periods of poor operating performance implying that there might be more scope for improvement when a non-family successor is appointed. Unlike the US sample in McConaughy et al. McConaughy, D.L., Walker, M.C., Henderson, G.V., Mishra, C.S., 1998. Founding family controlled firms: efficiency and value, Review of Financial Economics 7, 1–19.], which indicates that the median percentage of votes held by controlling families is less than 15%, the Canadian sample indicates a more concentrated ownership with the median percentage of family controlled votes exceeding 51%. Of the firms in our sample, 62% use dual class capitalization to maintain control within the family.