On the geography of conventions |
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Authors: | Andreas Blume Ted Temzelides |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, PA 15260, USA (e-mail: ablume@pitt.edu;tedt@pitt.edu) , US |
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Abstract: | Summary. We study an evolutionary model in which heterogenous boundedly rational agents interact locally in order to play a coordination
game. Agents differ in their mobility with mobile agents being able to relocate within a country. We find that mobile agents
enjoy a higher payoff and always benefit from increased mobility, while immobile agents benefit from increased mobility at
low levels of mobility only. This wedge in payoffs weakly increases as mobility increases. Some extensions are discussed.
Received: January 10, 2001; revised version: December 4, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" We thank, without implicating in any way, George Mailath for helpful discussions. Some of the ideas in this paper were
developed during the V Conference of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory in Ischia, Italy. The NSF provided
financial support.
Correspondence to: T. Temzelides |
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Keywords: | and Phrases: Evolutionary dynamics Restricted mobility Equilibrium selection |
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