| 监理与承包商合谋作假的博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 金晓萍. 监理与承包商合谋作假的博弈分析[J]. 价值工程, 2014, 0(17): 71-72 |
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| 作者姓名： | 金晓萍 |
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| 作者单位： | 浙江省嘉兴市港航管理局,嘉兴314033 |
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| 摘 要： | 本文从分析"监理与承包商合谋"的动机及特征入手,建立"监理与承包商合谋"博弈模型。通过模型求解分析,提出业主目标的实现很大程度上依赖于增加监督成效、加大惩罚力度、减少监督成本、做好教育宣传等综合措施。
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| 关 键 词： | 监理 承包商 合谋 博弈分析 |
Game Analysis on the Collusion Fraud of Supervision and Contractor |
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| JIN Xiao-ping. Game Analysis on the Collusion Fraud of Supervision and Contractor[J]. Value Engineering, 2014, 0(17): 71-72 |
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| Authors: | JIN Xiao-ping |
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| Affiliation: | JIN Xiao-ping ( Ports and Waterways Authority of Jiaxing, Zhejiang, Jiaxing 314033, China ) |
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| Abstract: | From the analysis of motives and characteristics of ＆quot;supervisor and contractor collusion＆quot;, this paper established the game model. Through model solving and analysis, this paper concluded that the realization of client＆#39;s goal to a large extent depended on a number of comprehensive measures, such as increasing effectiveness of supervision, increasing penalties, reducing the cost of supervision, doing well education advocacy. |
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| Keywords: | supervision contractor collusion game analysis |
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