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| SaaS采纳决策的不完美动态博弈 | |
| 引用本文： | 严建援,胡海清,周静,刘芹. SaaS采纳决策的不完美动态博弈[J]. 物流技术, 2012, 31(1): 70-74 |
| 作者姓名： | 严建援 胡海清 周静 刘芹 |
| 作者单位： | 1. 南开大学,天津,300071 2. 山东英才学院,山东济南,250104 3. 山东商业职业技术学院,山东济南,250103 |
| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金“基于SaaS的IT服务供应链激励与风险控制研究”(71172072);国家社科基金重大项目“我国现代服务业发展战略研究”(08AJY009) |
| 摘 要： | 利用双价模型分析提供不同服务类型的SaaS服务提供商与客户在不同市场类型中的博弈均衡,发现不同市场类型会对客户的购买行为产生影响,但并不会影响其对SaaS服务提供商类别的选择。该研究丰富了双价模型在不同市场类型中的均衡条件,并对SaaS服务市场构建有一定指导意义。 |
| 关 键 词： | SaaS 锁定 贝叶斯均衡 动态博弈 |
The Imperfect Dynamic Game Analysis of Decision of SaaS Adoption |
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| YAN Jian-yuan , HU Hai-qing , ZHOU Jing , LIU Qin. The Imperfect Dynamic Game Analysis of Decision of SaaS Adoption[J]. Logistics Technology, 2012, 31(1): 70-74 | |
| Authors: | YAN Jian-yuan HU Hai-qing ZHOU Jing LIU Qin |
| Affiliation: | 1.Nankai University,Tianjin 300071;2.Shandong Yingcai University,Ji’nan 250104; 3.Shangdong Institute of Commerce & Technology,Ji’nan 250103,China) |
| Abstract: | Using the duo-price model,the paper analyzes the game behaviors between providers of different types of SaaS and their customers in different types of market and finds that the difference in market types would influence the customers’ buying behavior but not their choice of the provider.This study contributes to the conditions of equilibrium of different types of market and is instructional to the construction of the SaaS market. |
| Keywords: | SaaS locking Bayes equilibrium dynamic game |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 万方数据 等数据库收录！ | |